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The Right to Redemption: Juvenile Dispositions and 
Sentences 
Katherine Hunt Federle 
INTRODUCTION 
The punishment of juveniles remains a troubling yet under-theorized 
aspect of the criminal and juvenile justice systems. These systems 
emphasize accountability, victim restoration, and retribution as reasons to 
punish underage offenders. In fact, American juvenile systems will 
remove the most egregious offenders to criminal courts for trial and 
sentencing. The United States Supreme Court in recent years, however, 
has issued a number of opinions emphasizing that the Eighth Amendment 
requires that the punishment of children must account for their lesser moral 
culpability, developmental immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation.1 
State courts also have begun to reconsider their own dispositional and 
sentencing schemes in light of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.2 
The reality of` juveniles’ immaturity militates in favor of a right to 
redemption. This Article begins by discussing the available data about the 
number and types of dispositions juveniles receive, waivers to criminal 
court, and the criminal sentences imposed. The analysis also considers the 
collateral consequences for minors who are adjudicated delinquent or who 
are criminally convicted. The discussion then turns to the effects of juvenile 
and criminal court involvement on children and the subsequent impact on 
life outcomes. The analysis considers theoretical, jurisprudential, and 
constitutional implications of juvenile sentencing with a special emphasis 
on the Supreme Court’s recent decisions. This Article concludes with the 
proposal for the contours of a right to redemption and its implications for 
reform to the current system and suggests strategies for the individual 
defense lawyer. 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by KATHERINE HUNT FEDERLE. 
  Joseph S. Platt-Porter Wright Morris and Arthur Professor of Law and 
Director, Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies at the Ohio State 
University Michael E. Moritz College of Law. 
 1. See infra notes 141–70 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases. 
 2. See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014) (rejecting mandatory 
minimum adult sentences imposed on juveniles); Diatchenko v. Commonwealth, 1 
N.E.3d 270 (Mass. 2013) (abolishing life without parole for juveniles). 
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I. THE PUNISHMENT OF JUVENILES 
A. Juvenile Court 
The empirical evidence suggests that young offenders—particularly 
those of color—remain at risk for harsh punishment. Despite significant 
declines in the number of cases and offenders handled by juvenile courts, 
disproportionality is evident at each decision-making point. Thus some 
youth of color are more likely to be court-involved and to receive the 
harshest dispositions than white youth. Moreover, more juveniles, 
especially minority youth, are being tried in criminal court as adults, thus 
bypassing the juvenile justice system entirely. As a consequence, more 
youth will experience criminal sanctions.  
For example, the number of cases handled in juvenile courts has 
declined significantly in the past few decades. In 2013, juvenile courts 
handled 1,058,500 cases, 44% fewer than were handled in 1997 and 9% 
fewer than in 1985.3 Nevertheless, the percentage of petitioned cases has 
increased. In 1985, 46% of delinquency cases were petitioned; by 1998, 
57% of all delinquency cases were petitioned, before falling to 55% in 
2013.4 Furthermore, the likelihood of formal processing not only increased 
between 1985 and 2013 but also across all offense categories. The 
likelihood of formal case processing increased from 48% to 58% for public 
order cases, 43% to 53% for property offense cases, 43% to 49% for drug 
offense cases, and 53% to 57% for person offense cases.5 
In 2013, 50% of all petitioned delinquency cases involved children 
under the age of 16. Of those children, 58% were white and 76% were 
male.6 However, formal case processing was more likely for cases 
involving older youth; in 2013 the likelihood of formal case processing for 
teens 16 and older increased to 59%, up from 51% in 1985.7 Moreover, 
although the likelihood of formal case processing increased across all 
racial groups, cases involving black youth were more likely to be formally 
processed than those involving white youth.8 In 2013, 61% of all 
                                                                                                             
 3. SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. 
JUST., JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2013, at 6 (2015). 
 4. Julie Furdella & Charles Puzzanchera, Delinquency Cases in Juvenile 
Court, 2013, JUV. OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS NAT’L REP. SERIES FACT SHEET (Off. 
of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention, Wash. D.C.) Oct. 2015, at 3. 
 5. HOCKENBERRY & PUZZANCHERA, supra note 3, at 36. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. at 37. 
 8. Id.  
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petitioned delinquency cases involved black youth compared to 52% for 
white youth.9 Additionally, formal processing for blacks was substantially 
more likely than for whites across all offense categories.10 
Of the 55% of cases processed formally, slightly more than half resulted 
in adjudication.11 Stated differently, in 2013, 31% of all delinquency cases 
resulted in either adjudication of delinquency or waiver to criminal court, 
similar to the level reported in 1985.12 Although the number of all adjudicated 
cases declined by 4% between 1985 and 2013, the number of adjudicated 
person offense cases and public order offense cases increased substantially, 
while the number of adjudicated property offense cases declined.13 Youth 
under the age of 16 comprised 51% of all adjudicated delinquency cases, but 
65% of all adjudicated forcible rape cases, 76% of other violent sex offenses, 
and 73% of all adjudicated arson cases.14 Of adjudicated cases, 22% involved 
female offenders and 61% of adjudicated youth were white.15 
Probation was the most frequently imposed disposition. In 2013, 64% 
of adjudicated youth received probation,16 a 6% increase in the number of 
cases since 1985, although the actual number of youth on probation has 
declined.17 Of adjudicated cases resulting in probation, 34% involved 
property offenses, 27% involved person offenses, 26% involved public 
order offenses, and 13% involved drug offenses.18 Although the likelihood 
of being placed on probation has increased since 1985 for both older and 
younger children, children 15 and younger are more likely to be placed on 
probation than children 16 and older.19 Of children 15 or younger, 67% 
received a disposition of probation in 2013, while 60% of children 16 and 
older received probation.20 The likelihood of being placed on probation 
also increased for both males and females since 1985.21 
                                                                                                             
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 42. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 43. 
 14. Id. at 42. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 50. 
 17. Id. at 49. 
 18. Id. at 50. 
 19. Id. at 51. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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Although all racial groups saw an increase in the likelihood of being 
placed on probation,22 important differences nevertheless exist across 
race. American-Indian youth, for example, saw a substantial increase in 
the likelihood of being placed on probation. In 1985, 40% of these youth 
received a disposition of probation compared to 61% in 2013.23 For Asian 
youth, the likelihood of being placed on probation increased from 64% in 
1985 to 74% in 2013, and for white youth the likelihood of receiving 
probation increased from 57% to 65%.24 For black youth, however, the 
likelihood of being placed on probation increased only from 60% in 1985 
to 61% in 2013.25 Across specific offenses, white, black, and American-
Indian youth were most likely to receive probation for drug offenses, while 
Asian youth were most likely to receive probation for public order 
offenses.26 Asian youth, however, were far more likely to receive 
probation across all offense categories than any other racial group.27  
Out-of-home placements were ordered in about one-fourth of all 
adjudicated cases in 2013, a decline from 1985 when out-of-home 
dispositions were ordered in 31% of the cases formally adjudicated.28 
Moreover, from 1985 to 2013, cases involving out-of-home placements 
decreased by 26% to its lowest level in 2013.29 Nevertheless, the types of 
cases warranting placement outside the home have remained fairly 
consistent. In 2013, approximately one-third of all placements outside the 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. Juvenile courts ordered probation in 74% of the drug cases involving 
white youth, 69% of the cases involving black youth, and 72% of the cases 
involving American Indians. Juvenile courts ordered probation in 76% of the 
public order cases involving Asian youth compared to 57% for whites, 54% for 
blacks, and 60% for American Indians. Id. 
 27. Id. Juvenile courts placed Asian youth on probation in 75% of person 
offense cases, 71% of property offenses, and 76% of public order cases. No data is 
available for drug cases because of the small numbers of Asian youth adjudicated 
for these offenses. Id. 
 28. Id. at 47. 
 29. Id. at 46. Moreover, significant declines based on gender occurred. In 
2013, 26% of adjudicated males and 19% of adjudicated females received a 
disposition of out-of-home placement compared to 32% and 27% respectively in 
1985. Declines based on age also were evident. Of adjudicated juveniles 16 and 
older, 27% received a disposition of out-of-home placement in 2013 compared to 
31% in 1985, while 21% of adjudicated juveniles 15 and younger were placed out 
of home in 2013 compared to 32% in 1985. Id. at 48. 
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home were for property offenses, although the proportion has declined 
since 1985, while 31% of placements outside the home involved public 
order offenses.30 An additional 29% of out-of-home placements involved 
person offenses, while 8% involved drug cases.31  
The likelihood of receiving an out-of-home placement declined across all 
racial groups between 1985 and 2013 with some groups experiencing 
significant decreases in the likelihood of out-of-home placement. In 2013, 
American-Indian juveniles were placed outside the home in 24% of the 
adjudicated cases compared to 41% of the cases in 1985.32 Similarly, Asian 
youth received an out-of-home disposition in 18% of the adjudicated cases in 
2013, but comprised 31% of such placements in 1985.33 Declines were more 
modest but still significant for black and white youth. In 2013, black youth 
were placed out of the home in 27% of adjudicated cases compared to 34% of 
those cases in 1985, and white youth were placed outside the home in 23% of 
the adjudicated cases compared to 30% in 1985.34  
Despite reductions in the use of out-of-home placements, notable race-
based differences exist. Black children were more likely to be placed out 
of the home than any other racial group in 2013. Moreover, black youth 
were most likely to be placed out of the home in property, drug, and public 
order offense cases, while American-Indian youth were most likely to be 
placed outside the home in person offense cases. Black juveniles were 
involved in 27% of property, 21% of drug, and 27% of public order offense 
cases resulting in an out-of-home placement.35 Of all adjudicated person 
offense cases resulting in an out-of-home placement, however, 31% 
involved American Indians compared to 29% involving blacks, 25% 
whites, and 20% Asians.36 
The disproportionality evident at each decision-making point 
contributes to the overall disparity of the system. Although black youth 
comprised 16% of the youth population in the United States in 2013, they 
constituted 35% of all delinquency cases handled by the juvenile courts 
and were more than twice as likely to be referred to juvenile court as white 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. at 46. 
 31. Id. Public order offenses include escapes, weapons offenses, and probation 
and parole violations, which might explain the relatively high number of these cases 
resulting in out-of-home placements. Id. 
 32. Id. at 48. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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youth.37 Furthermore, as cases involving black youth proceed through the 
juvenile system, the disproportionality becomes more pronounced and has 
more serious consequences. For example, the rate at which referred cases 
were formally processed was 20% greater for black youth than for white, 
and black youth comprised 42% of all person offense cases in juvenile 
courts.38 Additionally, the rate at which black youth were ordered into 
residential placement after adjudication was 20% greater than for white 
youth, while white youth were more likely to receive a disposition of 
probation.39 In sum, despite declining rates of juvenile offending, youth of 
color—and especially black youth—experience disproportionate court 
involvement and are more likely to receive harsher punishment. 
B. Criminal Court 
A significant number of youth are denied even the limited benefit of 
juvenile court. In 2013, juvenile court judges sent 1%—approximately 
4,000 cases—of all petitioned delinquency cases to criminal court for 
trial,40 although the number of cases waived has declined by 31% since 
1985.41 Moreover, the type of case that juvenile court judges transfer also 
has changed substantially. Person offense cases comprised 33% of the 
waived caseload in 1985 but 50% of that caseload in 2013.42 In contrast, 
property offense cases comprised 53% of waived cases in 1985 but 
declined to 31% of waived cases by 2013.43 Drug offense cases, however, 
constituted 12% of the waived cases in 2013, compared to 5% in 1985, 
while public order offense cases comprised 6% of all judicially waived 
cases in 2013, down from 11% in 1985.44 
Additionally, although the likelihood of waiver was lower across all 
racial groups in 2013 compared to 1985, black and American-Indian youth 
were nonetheless more likely to be waived to criminal court for trial than 
                                                                                                             
 37. Furdella & Puzzanchera, supra note 4, at 2. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. HOCKENBERRY & PUZZANCHERA, supra note 3, at 36. 
 41. Id. at 38. Despite the decline in the number of waived cases, some of the 
demographic characteristics of the waived juvenile remain remarkably similar. 
Although the percentage of cases involving juveniles over the age of 16 has 
declined since 1985, older juveniles still were more likely to be transferred to 
criminal court for trial across all offense categories than younger youth in 2013. 
Id. at 40. 
 42. Id. at 39. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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white youth. For example, in 1985, black youth were more likely to be 
waived across all offense categories than white youth45 and in 2004, were 
more likely to be transferred to criminal court for trial in person and drug 
cases than were white.46 Compared to white youth, black youth were as 
likely to be waived for property and public order offenses but slightly more 
likely to be waived for cases involving person and drug crimes in 2013.47 
Nevertheless, the rate at which cases involving black youth were transferred 
was 30% greater than for cases involving white youth.48 Similarly, cases 
involving American-Indian youth were more likely to be waived than cases 
involving white and black youth for public order offenses in 1985,49 person 
offenses in 2004,50 and property and drug offense cases in 2013.51 
A closer examination of the data, however, reveals an even more 
dramatic increase and subsequent decline in the use of judicial waiver 
between 1985 and 2013. At its peak in 1994, the number of cases waived 
to criminal court was 124% greater than the number waived in 1985.52 The 
increases were even more significant when examining the use of judicial 
waiver by offense type. For example, the number of person cases waived 
in 1994 was 191% greater than in 1985, while the number of drug offense 
cases increased by 452% between 1985 and 1995.53 The use of judicial 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. at 40. In 1985, 2.1% of person offense, 1.1% of property offense, 1.5% 
of drug offense, and 0.9% of public order offense cases involving black youth 
were waived to criminal court. In contrast, 1.8% of person offense, 1.0% of 
property offense, 0.7% of drug offense, and 0.5% of public order offense cases 
involving white youth were transferred to criminal court. Id. 
 46. Id. In 2004, 1.2% of person offense cases involving black youth were 
waived compared to 1.0% of those cases involving white youth. Similarly, 1.1% 
of drug offense cases involving black youth were transferred but only 0.9% of 
drug offense cases involving white youth were waived. Id. 
 47. Id. In 2013, 1.4% of person offense cases involving black youth and 1.1% of 
person offense cases involving white youth were waived, and 0.8% of drug offense 
cases involving black youth and 0.6% involving white youth were waived. Id. 
 48. Furdella & Puzzanchera, supra note 4, at 2. 
 49. HOCKENBERRY & PUZZANCHERA, supra note 3, at 40. In 1985, 2.1% of 
person offense, 1.0% of property offense, and 1.0% of public order offense cases 
involving American-Indian youth were waived to criminal court. Id. 
 50. Id. In 2004, 1.6% of person offense cases involving American Indians 
were waived compared to 1.2% for black and 1.0% for white youth. Id. 
 51. Id. Of property offense cases involving American-Indian youth, 1.1% 
were transferred to criminal court compared to 0.6% of those cases involving 
white and black children. Of the drug offense cases, 1.2% involving American 
Indians, 0.8% involving blacks, and 0.6% involving whites were waived. Id. 
 52. Id. at 38. 
 53. Id. 
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waiver then declined by 50% between 1994 and 2001, remained relatively 
stable until 2007, and declined by an additional 41% by 2013.54 
This substantial decline in the use of judicial waiver might be 
attributable to changes in state legislation.55 In response to the increase in 
juvenile crime, many jurisdictions enacted legislation that enabled states to try 
children in criminal courts without requiring juvenile court judges to make the 
transfer decision.56 By redefining the parameters of juvenile court jurisdiction, 
states excluded certain juveniles from juvenile court based on their ages, prior 
offense histories, or the offenses alleged.57 Other waiver mechanisms gave 
prosecutors the discretion to file in criminal court58 or required juvenile courts 
to waive if certain criteria were met.59 Consequently, although the use of 
judicial waiver declined, other transfer mechanisms may have supplanted the 
use of judicial waiver. 
Unfortunately, no national data set exists as to the number of juveniles 
transferred to criminal court to stand trial through other waiver mechanisms.60 
Nevertheless, by some estimates as many as 250,000 children enter the 
criminal justice system each year.61 Some data indicate that non-judicial 
waiver mechanisms send more children to criminal court than juvenile court 
judges’ transfers. For example, between 2011 and 2014, the juvenile court in 
New Orleans waived only one case to criminal court for trial through a 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State 
Transfer Laws and Reporting, JUV. OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS NAT’L RPT. SERIES 
BULL. (Office of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention, Wash. D.C.), Sept. 2011, at 9. 
 57. Id. at 2. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 4. Many jurisdictions have multiple transfer mechanisms. Id. at 4–5. 
 60. Id. at 1. In 2010, the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the United States 
Department of Justice solicited proposals for a survey of juveniles charged in 
adult courts. The grant was awarded to Westat, which hired the National Center 
for Juvenile Justice as a subcontractor. Although the data was supposed to be 
available in 2012, the Bureau of Justice Statistics expanded its survey of the data 
to include criminal court case processing. The data on juvenile transfer was 
expected in 2015. John Kelly, Fed Study on Juveniles in Adult Court Delayed 
Until at Least 2015, CHRON. OF SOC. CHANGE (July 29, 2013), https://chronicle 
ofsocialchange.org/featured/fed-study-on-juveniles-in-adult-court-delayed-until-
at-least-2015/3639 [https://perma.cc/9KEJ-NZLQ]. However, no data has yet 
been released. 
 61. JASON ZIEDENBERG, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., YOU’RE AN ADULT NOW: 
YOUTH IN ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 3 (2011). 
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discretionary judicial waiver mechanism.62 In comparison, the district 
attorney prosecuted 127 youth between the ages of 15 and 16—83% of the 
eligible minors—in criminal court through the use of prosecutorial 
discretion.63  
State-level data indicates a similar trend. In Michigan, the juvenile 
court has no jurisdiction over 17-year-olds, who therefore are prosecuted 
as adults.64 Of the over 20,000 youth convicted as adults between 2003 
and 2013, 95% of those children were 17 years old at the time of the 
offense and therefore automatically excluded from the juvenile court.65 In 
Florida, over 12,000 youth were tried as adults between 2009 and 2013.66 
However, over 97% of these children were tried in criminal court because 
of a state law permitting prosecutors to file charges directly without any 
hearing or procedure in juvenile court.67  
Non-judicial waiver mechanisms accounted for over 90% of all 
juvenile transfers to criminal court for trial in Arizona between 2011 and 
                                                                                                             
 62. S. POVERTY L. CTR., MORE HARM THAN GOOD: HOW CHILDREN ARE 
UNJUSTLY TRIED AS ADULTS IN NEW ORLEANS 11 (2016). Under state law, 17-
year-olds are excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction. LA. CONST. ANN. art. V, 
§ 19 (2011). Youth 15 and 16 years old charged with certain designated offenses 
will be tried in criminal court automatically if either a juvenile court judge or a 
grand jury finds probable cause for the minor’s arrest. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 
305(A) (2016). Moreover, the district attorney has the discretion to file in criminal 
court for other offenses that 15- and 16-year-olds allegedly committed upon a 
juvenile court judge’s finding of probable cause or after obtaining a grand jury 
indictment. Id. art. 305(B). 
 63. S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 62, at 11. The district attorney filed 
charges in criminal court against 127 of the 154 youth eligible to be tried in 
criminal court. Moreover, the use of prosecutorial waiver in Orleans Parish far 
exceeds its use in other parishes. For example, Caddo Parish tried 39% of its 
eligible cases in criminal court, and Jefferson Parish tried 22%, while the rate of 
transfer in East Baton Rouge Parish was five times less than in Orleans. Id. 
 64. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2a (West 2016). A bill to raise the 
maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction to 18 is pending in the state 
legislature. H.B. 4947, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015). 
 65. MICHELLE WEEMHOFF & KRISTEN STALEY, MICH. COUNCIL ON CRIME & 
DELINQ., YOUTH BEHIND BARS 10 (2014). 
 66. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRANDED FOR LIFE: FLORIDA’S PROSECUTION 
OF CHILDREN AS ADULTS UNDER ITS “DIRECT FILE” STATUTE 24 (2014). 
Approximately 0.6% of these children were transferred by a juvenile court judge 
after a hearing in juvenile court. Id. at 24 n.69.  
 67. Id. at 24. 
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2015.68 Far more cases are filed directly in criminal court by prosecutors 
than are transferred by juvenile court judges.69 The vast majority of these 
cases, however, are transferred under state statutes that require prosecutors 
to file charges directly in criminal court when the minor is a certain age 
and is charged with a specified violent offense, is a chronic offender, or 
has a designated felony conviction.70 Thus, in 2015, almost 60% of the 
cases were automatically filed in criminal court.71 
Similarly, more children in California are tried as adults through a 
direct-file mechanism than are waived to criminal court for trial. Between 
2003 and 2014, juvenile courts transferred 3,193 children to criminal 
court, but prosecutors charged 7,162 youth directly in criminal court 
during the same time period.72 In 2008, the number of all California cases 
                                                                                                             
 68. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., ARIZ. SUP. CT., ARIZONA’S JUVENILE COURT 
COUNTS: STATEWIDE STATISTICAL INFORMATION FY 2015, at 52 (2016).  
 69. In 2011, prosecutors exercised their discretion to file in criminal court in 
42.03% of the transferred cases, while judicial waiver accounted for only 6.59% 
of these cases. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., ARIZ. SUP. CT., ARIZONA’S JUVENILE 
COURT COUNTS: STATEWIDE STATISTICAL INFORMATION FY 2011, at 46 (2012). 
In 2012 and 2013, prosecutorial discretion was used in 37.91% of the cases and 
judicial waiver resulted in 6.5% of the cases waived to criminal court. JUV. JUST. 
SERVS. DIV., ARIZ. SUP. CT., ARIZONA’S JUVENILE COURT COUNTS: STATEWIDE 
STATISTICAL INFORMATION FY 2012, at 46 (2013); JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., ARIZ. 
SUP. CT., ARIZONA’S JUVENILE COURT COUNTS: STATEWIDE STATISTICAL 
INFORMATION FY 2013, at 46 (2014). In 2014, judicial waiver constituted 5.47% 
of all transferred cases, and prosecutorial discretion accounted for 27.73%. JUV. 
JUST. SERVS. DIV., ARIZ. SUP. CT., ARIZONA’S JUVENILE COURT COUNTS: 
STATEWIDE STATISTICAL INFORMATION FY 2014, at 46 (2015). Judicial waiver 
accounted for 5.36% of the transferred cases and prosecutorial discretion 
composed 35.27% of these cases in 2015. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2015, supra 
note 68, at 46. In all years, the majority of cases are transferred pursuant to 
mandatory statutory waiver provisions requiring trial in juvenile court based on 
the age, offense, and/or prior record of the juvenile. 
 70. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501(A) (2016) (criminal prosecution 
shall be brought against a 15-, 16-, or 17-year-old juvenile alleged to have 
committed a specified felony offense or who is a chronic felony offender in the 
same manner as an adult); Id. § 13-501(C) (criminal prosecution shall be brought 
against a juvenile in the same manner as an adult who has allegedly committed a 
criminal offense and who has an historical prior felony conviction). 
 71. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2015, supra note 68, at 46. 
 72. In 2003, juvenile courts waived 404 juveniles, while prosecutors filed 
charges in 410 cases directly in criminal court. 2003 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. 
JUST. IN CAL. 6–7. Juvenile courts transferred 252 juveniles in 2004 and 
prosecutors directly filed charges in 283 cases. 2004 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. 
JUST. IN CAL. 6–7. In 2005, 318 youth were judicially transferred and 343 were 
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tried in criminal court peaked at 866 directly filed and 332 judicially 
waived cases73 before declining in 2014 to 474 directly filed and 122 
judicially waived cases.74 Nevertheless, the proportion of cases directly 
filed in criminal court increased between 2009 and 2013 before declining 
in 2014. Thus, in 2009 more than twice as many cases were filed directly 
in criminal court than were judicially waived.75 By 2013, more than five 
times as many cases involving juvenile defendants were filed by 
prosecutors in criminal court than were transferred by juvenile court 
judges.76 Although the proportion of directly filed to judicially waived 
cases decreased in 2014, criminal courts heard almost four times as many 
directly filed cases than judicially waived cases that year.77 
From this data, disproportionality clearly remains a hallmark of non-
judicial waiver. Although black youth comprise only 18% of the youth 
                                                                                                             
charged directly in criminal court. 2005 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. 
6–7. Juvenile courts waived 263 juveniles in 2006 and prosecutors filed charges 
against 654 youth directly in criminal court. 2006 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. 
IN CAL. 6, 40. In 2007, juvenile court judges transferred 401 youth to criminal 
court and 724 were charged in criminal court. 2007 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. 
JUST. IN CAL. 6, 40. In 2008, 332 youth were waived, but 866 were charged 
directly in criminal court. 2008 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv, 38. In 
2009, prosecutors charged 769 youth directly in criminal court and judges 
transferred an additional 346 youth. 2009 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. 
iv, 38. Juvenile courts waived 260 children in 2010 and prosecutors charged 716 
youth in criminal court. 2010 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv–v. In 
2011, 227 juveniles were waived, but prosecutors charged 686 as adults in 
criminal court. 2011 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv, 40. Juvenile 
courts transferred 146 youth in 2012, but prosecutors filed charges against 604 
youth directly in criminal court. 2012 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv–
v. In 2013, 122 juveniles were waived but 633 were charged directly in criminal 
court. 2013 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv–v. Juvenile courts 
transferred 122 youth in 2014 and prosecutors filed charges against 474 teens in 
criminal court. 2014 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv, 40. 
 73. 2008 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 72. 
 74. 2014 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 72. 
 75. In 2009, prosecutors charged 769 youth directly in criminal court, and 
judges transferred an additional 346 youth. 2009 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 
72. The rate of direct filing was more than twice that of judicial waiver. 
 76. In 2013, 122 juveniles were waived, but 633 were charged directly in 
criminal court. 2013 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 72. The direct filing rate 
was more than five times that of waiver. 
 77. Juvenile courts transferred 122 youth in 2014, while prosecutors filed 
charges against 474 teens in criminal court. 2014 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 
72. 
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population in Michigan, they account for 59% of all youth tried as adults.78 
Moreover, 53% of all 17-year-olds under the jurisdiction of the Michigan 
Department of Corrections are youth of color.79 In Florida, although black 
children constitute only 27.2% of all arrested youth, they comprise 51.4% 
of all cases transferred to criminal court, and white youth account for 28% 
of all arrests but only 24.4% of transfers.80 Black teens also are more likely 
than whites to be transferred for felony drug or other violent offenses, 
although both groups have similar waiver rates for murder and property 
offenses.81 
In Arizona and California, black and Hispanic youth are disproportionately 
represented among all youth tried in criminal courts as adults through non-
judicial transfer mechanisms. Between 2011 and 2015, Hispanic youth 
comprised on average 60% of the youth tried because of direct filings in 
criminal courts,82 although Hispanic youth between 14 and 17 constituted about 
42% of the youth population.83 Black youth comprised only 5% of the 14- to 
17-year-old population in the state84 but accounted for between 14% and 
                                                                                                             
 78. WEEMHOFF & STALEY, supra note 65, at 11. 
 79. Id. at 10. 
 80. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 66, at 29. 
 81. Id. at 30–31. 
 82. In 2011, Hispanic youth composed 62.06% of all direct filings. JUV. JUST. 
SERVS. DIV., FY 2011, supra note 69, at 48. In 2012, Hispanic teens constituted 
61% of direct filings, JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2012, supra note 69, at pg. 48, 
and in 2013, composed 56.42% of direct filings. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2013, 
supra note 69, at 48. Hispanic youth accounted for 58.15% of these cases in 2014, 
JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2014, supra note 69, at 49, and 59.91% in 2015. JUV. 
JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2015, supra note 68, at 49. In contrast, white teens, who 
compose a greater proportion of the population than any other racial group, 
constituted a far smaller percentage of the direct filings. In 2011, cases involving 
white youth constituted 20% of the direct filings. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 
2011, supra note 69, at 48. In 2012, 17.37% of the direct filings involved white 
youth. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2012, supra note 69, at 48. In 2013, 19.84% of 
the filings involved whites. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2013, supra note 69, at 48. 
In 2014, 22.47% of these cases involved white youth. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 
2014, supra note 69, at 49. By 2015, the percentage of direct filings against white 
youth had declined to 14.62%. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2015, supra note 68, at 
49. 
 83. The population estimate was generated at Nat’l Ctr. For Juv. Just., Easy 
Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990-2014, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. 
PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov./ojstatbb/ezapop/asp/profile_selection.asp [https: 
//perma.cc/PAW9-R5BA] (last updated Sept. 1, 2015). 
 84. Id. 
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21% of teens charged in criminal court.85 In California, black teens made up 
about 7% of the 14- to 17-year-old population86 but comprised 27% of the cases 
filed directly in criminal court in 2014.87 Prosecutors filed approximately 58% 
of the cases against Hispanic youth,88 who constituted about 50% of the relevant 
population.89 White youth, in contrast, were charged in only 10% of the cases 
in 2014,90 although they comprised about 30% of 14- to 17-year-olds.91 Thus, 
although fewer juveniles are sent to criminal court by juvenile court judges, far 
more youth are tried as adults in criminal court as a result of non-judicial waiver 
mechanisms, and those juveniles are disproportionately youth of color. 
C. Consequences of Justice System Involvement 
Although trying juveniles as adults may serve the retributive purposes 
of the criminal justice system, little evidence of a deterrent effect exists. 
Several methodologically sound studies have found that youth tried in 
criminal court have higher recidivism rates than those who were tried in 
juvenile court.92 Moreover, incarceration in an adult facility seemingly 
does not consider the criminogenic effect of adult court processing, as 
youth who received even probationary sentences were more likely to 
reoffend compared to those tried in the juvenile justice system.93 
                                                                                                             
 85. In 2011, black youth composed 14.12% of all direct filings. JUV. JUST. 
SERVS. DIV., FY 2011, supra note 69, at 48. In 2012, black teens constituted 
16.99% of direct filings, JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2012, supra note 69, at 48, 
and in 2013, 20.62% of direct filings. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2013, supra note 
69, at 48. Blacks accounted for 14.54% of these cases in 2014, JUV. JUST. SERVS. 
DIV., FY 2014, supra note 69, at 49, and 20.28% in 2015. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., 
FY 2015, supra note 68, at 49. 
 86. See supra note 83. 
 87. 2014 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 72, at 27. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See supra note 83. 
 90. 2014 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 72, at 27. 
 91. See supra note 83. 
 92. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to 
Delinquency?, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Off. of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention, Wash. 
D.C.) June 2010, at 6. Redding reviewed several large-scale studies funded by the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention that examined the effect 
of waiver on recidivism among juvenile offenders. Id. 
 93. Id. For seven years researchers followed 2,382 youths, ages 15 and 16, 
from a large metropolitan area that covered several counties in New York and 
New Jersey. The researchers found that recidivism rates were unrelated to 
incarceration in adult institutions as compared to juvenile facilities. Id. 
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Additionally, although studies found a reduction in recidivism among 
transferred drug offenders, the effect on the recidivism rates of nonviolent 
property offenders was mixed.94 Recidivism rates among violent and 
presumably the most serious juvenile offenders tried in criminal court, 
however, were higher than for youth who remained in the juvenile justice 
system.95 
Paradoxically, rather than serving as a deterrent, transfer may increase 
crime and criminality.96 Researchers have hypothesized that the labeling of a 
juvenile offender as a felon has stigmatizing consequences. For example, 
being labeled as a felon might significantly affect the youth’s ability to obtain 
employment or be reintegrated into his community.97 Other studies suggest 
that juveniles may resent the imposition of a sentence they perceive as unjust, 
impacting their self-worth, and thus they may defiantly reoffend.98 In adult 
facilities, juveniles also learn criminal behavior from adult inmates to protect 
themselves from further victimization and consequently accept violence as a 
part of their daily routines.99 Finally, the absence of developmentally 
appropriate rehabilitative services for juvenile offenders in adult facilities 
combined with the loss of family support increases the risk of repeat 
offending.100 
Transfer laws also may fail to generally deter juveniles from committing 
crimes in the first place. Although evidence for a general deterrent effect 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. Two studies in the 1990s found that transfer had no effect on or that it 
reduced recidivism. Later studies in the same jurisdiction as the earlier studies, 
however, found that transfer did increase recidivism. Id. 
 95. Id. Six large-scale studies of youth in five different states with different 
types of transfer laws found that waiver increases recidivism among youth tried 
in criminal court. Id. 
 96. Id. at 4.  
 97. Id. at 7. 
 98. Id. “Many experience the court process . . . as a condemnation of them. . . . 
Far from viewing the criminal court . . . as legitimate, the juvenile offenders . . . saw 
. . . [it] as duplicitous and manipulative, malevolent in intent, and indifferent to their 
needs.” Id. (quoting Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, 
in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS 
TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 227 (Jeffrey Fagan ed., 2000)). 
 99. Id. at 7–8. “[I]ncarceration in adult facilities may have brutalizing effects 
on juveniles, which may partly account for their increased recidivism. (The term 
‘brutalization effect’ describes the finding that homicide rates in a State often 
increase after an execution . . . perhaps because executions model and communicate 
that violence is an acceptable . . . alternative.)” Id. at 8. 
 100. Id. at 7. 
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is not overwhelming,101 general deterrence is clearly most successful when 
potential offenders believe that the chances of being apprehended are high and 
that they will receive a substantial sentence. But the deterrent effect is evident 
only when offenders actually consider the penalty before engaging in criminal 
conduct.102 In one study, researchers found that despite an attempt to raise 
public awareness of transfer laws, few juveniles knew about the possibility of 
being tried as adults.103 Those who did know did not anticipate that the law 
would be enforced against them or that they would receive a serious 
punishment.104 The failure to appreciate the risk is consistent with the 
immaturity associated with adolescence. Risk-taking and the focus on short-
term gains are consistent with a developing brain and thus make general 
deterrence less likely to be effective.105 
Other negative effects of transfer to the criminal system exist. One 
obvious consequence is the imposition of harsher penalties and the acquisition 
of a criminal record with its associated collateral consequences.106 Juveniles 
incarcerated in adult facilities also experience higher rates of physical and 
sexual abuse and victimization from other inmates as well as staff, perhaps 
because of their relative size or inexperience.107 Furthermore, youth 
incarcerated in adult correctional facilities have higher rates of mental health 
symptoms, including depression, psychological distress and trauma, anxiety, 
and post-traumatic stress disorder.108 Incarceration in adult facilities thus 
                                                                                                             
 101. It is difficult to conclude if transfer laws have a generally deterrent effect 
because it is hard to estimate the amount of crime that might have occurred. 
Moreover, whether general deterrence might be attributable to waiver provisions 
is unclear. Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Transfer of Juveniles to Adult 
Court: Effects of a Broad Policy in One Court, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Off. of Juv. Just. 
& Delinq. Prevention, Wash. D.C.) Dec. 2012, at 6. 
 102. Redding, supra note 92, at 4.  
 103. Richard E. Redding & Elizabeth J. Fuller, What Do Juvenile Offenders 
Know About Being Tried as Adults? Implications for Deterrence, 55 JUV. & FAM. 
CT. J. 35, 49 (Summer 2004). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Redding, supra note 92, at 4. 
 106. Ian Lambie & Isabel Randell, The Impact of Incarceration on Juvenile 
Offenders, 33 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 448, 454 (2013). By some estimates, as 
many as 38,000 collateral consequences of a criminal conviction on the state and 
federal levels might exist. Christopher Gowen, Lisa Thurau, & Meghan Wood, The 
ABA’s Approach to Juvenile Justice Reform: Education, Eviction, and Employment: 
The Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Adjudication, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 187, 188 (2011). 
 107. Lambie & Randell, supra note 106, at 452. 
 108. Id. at 453. 
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may cause many of these problems or even exacerbate their symptoms for 
youth with preexisting mental conditions.109 
Incarcerating juveniles in adult facilities may limit juveniles’ future 
life prospects. Although strong evidence suggests that most juveniles will 
grow out of their criminal behavior, prison sentences may delay or impede 
that natural process.110 While institutionalized, juveniles certainly engage 
with antisocial peers, and those interactions may reinforce criminal 
behavior.111 The emphasis on punishment rather than rehabilitation in 
adult correctional facilities may preclude the provision of appropriate 
educational programs for juvenile offenders, including special education 
services.112 The nutritional needs of juveniles often are unmet, and obesity 
resulting from their sedentary lifestyles is concerning.113 Moreover, 
substance abuse and sexual activity that occur in prison could have long-
term health effects for juveniles once they are released.114 Finally, 
sufficient aftercare programming might not exist for juveniles after they 
are released from adult facilities, which cripples their ability to reintegrate 
into their communities.115 
Nevertheless, although it is clear that juvenile facilities are preferable 
to adult prisons for youth, institutionalization has negative effects on 
youth. Although most juveniles age out of criminal offending as they 
become psychosocially mature,116 institutionalization might delay 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 451. Several studies have found that although many juveniles engage 
in serious delinquent behavior, almost all naturally stop offending as they mature. For 
example, one study found that only a small percentage of juvenile offenders continued 
with their serious offending, and even those offenders reported a decrease in offenses 
as they aged. Edward P. Mulvey, Highlights From Pathways to Desistance: A 
Longitudinal Study of Serious Adolescent Offending, JUV. JUST. FACT SHEET (Off. of 
Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention, Wash. D.C.) Mar. 2011, at 3. 
 111. Lambie & Randell, supra note 106, at 451. See also Committee on 
Adolescence, American Academy of Pediatrics, Health Care for Youth in the Juvenile 
Justice System, 128 PEDIATRICS 1219, 1229 (2011) (“Juveniles in adult prisons report 
learning more about criminal behavior from adult inmates . . . .”).  
 112. Lambie & Randell, supra note 106, at 454. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. Researchers hypothesize that increased risk-taking may lead adolescents 
to engage in unsafe sexual practices, substance abuse, and violence. Id. 
 115. Id. at 454–55.  
 116. Laurence Steinberg, Elizabeth Cauffman & Kathryn C. Monahan, 
Psychosocial Maturity and Desistance From Crime in a Sample of Serious 
Juvenile Offenders JUV. JUST. BULL. (Off. of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention, 
Wash. D.C.) Mar. 2015, at 9. The researchers studied 1,300 juvenile offenders for 
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maturation by impeding the development of a pro-social lifestyle.117 
Certainly, as in adult facilities, juveniles are exposed to more antisocial 
peers,118 may have less contact with family and community,119 and may 
exhibit more aggressive behavior.120 Further, other juveniles and staff 
physically and sexually victimize juveniles,121 which may increase the risk 
of suicide or suicidal ideation.122 Incarceration also disrupts educational 
achievement because juvenile facilities tend to provide an inferior 
educational experience for youth,123 and their physical health may suffer 
because of risks associated with violence, substance abuse, sexual activity, 
or the more sedentary lifestyle experienced while institutionalized.124 
Conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities also may contribute to 
the pain juveniles experience while incarcerated. Most juvenile offenders 
are held in public facilities125 that overwhelmingly have one or more 
confinement features, such as fences or walls with razor wire, internal 
security doors, or secure day rooms for youth.126 Staff often use mechanical 
restraints such as handcuffs, restraining chairs, strait jackets, leg cuffs, or 
leather straps.127 They may rely on some type of isolation, often locking 
youth in their rooms for four or more hours, particularly in training schools, 
reception centers, and detention centers.128 Despite a decline in both the 
                                                                                                             
seven years after conviction. Involvement in delinquent and criminal behavior 
increased through adolescence, peaking at about age 16 or 17. Although a small 
number continued to offend, the vast majority stopped engaging in criminal 
behavior as they became more psychosocially mature. Id. at 2. 
 117. Lambie & Randell, supra note 106, at 454–55. 
 118. Id. at 451. 
 119. Id. at 454. 
 120. Id. at 452. 
 121. Id. at 452–53. 
 122. Id. at 453–54. 
 123. Id. at 454. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Sarah Hockenberry, Melissa Sickmund & Anthony Sladky, Juvenile 
Residential Facility Census, 2012: Selected Findings, JUV. OFFENDERS AND 
VICTIMS NAT’L RPT. SERIES BULL. (Off. of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention, 
Laurel, MD.), Mar. 2015, at 3. 
 126. Id. at 4. 
 127. Id. at 12. Mechanical restraints are used by 58% of training schools, 46% 
of reception centers, and 40% of detention centers. Id.  
 128. Id. Youth are locked in their rooms for four or more hours at 47% of 
training schools, 44% of detention centers, and 32% of reception centers. Id.  
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number of juvenile facilities and the number of offenders,129 overcrowding 
remains a problem at one in five juvenile facilities.130 Moreover, suicide 
was the most common cause of death among youth held in juvenile 
facilities131 with most occurring weeks after admission.132  
The collateral consequences of juvenile adjudications are extensive and 
could affect juveniles well into their adult lives. Juveniles might be suspended 
or expelled from school, thereby affecting their future educational and 
employment opportunities.133 Their juvenile records could be made available 
to prospective employers who might be unwilling to hire youths with juvenile 
records.134 Juveniles might be required to reveal their prior juvenile court 
involvement on college and graduate school applications or when applying 
for a professional license, which could result in the application’s denial.135 
Sex offender registration laws might require juveniles to register well into 
adulthood and might trigger community-notification requirements that 
might affect juveniles’ ability to remain in the neighborhood.136 Both sex 
offender registration laws and drug-related convictions could result in an 
eviction from public housing of juveniles and their entire families, even if 
other family members were not at fault.137 Although juveniles might not 
be deported based on delinquency adjudications, they can be deported 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. at 8. Between 2000 and 2012, the number of juvenile facilities 
declined 35% and the number of offenders declined 47%. Id. 
 130. Id. at 10. Facilities holding between 1 and 10 residents reported the 
highest rate of overcrowding at 24%, followed by facilities with 21 to 50 residents 
at 23%. Id. 
 131. Id. at 13. In the one-year reporting period between October 1, 2011 and 
September 30, 2012, 14 youth died in juvenile facilities. Five deaths were due to 
suicide, four were attributable to illness or natural causes, three were accidents, 
and two were due to homicide. The death rate was higher for private facilities. 
Most deaths occurred at detention facilities. Id.  
 132. Id. at 14. One suicide, however, did occur on the youth’s first day of 
admission. Id. 
 133. Gowen et al., supra note 106, at 193–94. 
 134. RIYA SAHA SHAH & JEAN STOUT, JUV. LAW CTR., FUTURE INTERRUPTED: 
THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY PROLIFERATION OF JUVENILE RECORDS 
11 (Feb. 2016). One study found that black youth were more likely to be denied 
employment than white youth. Id. at 6. 
 135. Id. at 10; Gowen et al., supra note 106, at 194–96. 
 136. See, e.g., KATHERINE HUNT FEDERLE, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH WITH CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTS 357 
(2013). 
 137. Wendy J. Kaplan & David Rossman, Called “Out” at Home: The One 
Strike Eviction Policy and Juvenile Court, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 
112 (2011). 
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based on their bad acts.138 Moreover, if the conviction relates to drug 
trafficking, the offender’s age is irrelevant.139 A juvenile might be unable to 
enlist in the military, could lose driving privileges,140 or even be barred from 
obtaining federal financial aid for college.141 
In summary, juvenile court involvement exposes children to 
consequences that could last a lifetime. Although evidence suggests that 
most youth grow out of juvenile offending, prolonged exposure to juvenile 
justice system mechanisms might delay or impede their maturation. In fact, 
juvenile court involvement could have iatrogenic effects.142 Additionally, 
transferring juveniles to the adult system for prosecution and punishment 
has even more serious and long-lasting effects. The paradox is that justice 
system involvement may actually result in both more offenses and graver 
offenses. 
II. THE RIGHT TO REDEMPTION 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
children are constitutionally different from adults and that these differences 
require the singular treatment of children at sentencing.143 First, because of 
their immaturity and impulsiveness, children are more likely to engage in 
behaviors and make decisions that are ill-considered.144 Second, they are 
more likely to succumb to negative influences and peer pressure, and 
because they have less control over their environment, they cannot easily 
extricate themselves from these situations.145 Finally, because children are 
                                                                                                             
 138. Elizabeth M. Frankel, Detention and Deportation with Inadequate Due 
Process: The Devastating Consequences of Juvenile Involvement with Law 
Enforcement for Immigrant Youth, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 63, 90 (2011). 
 139. Id. at 91. 
 140. SHAH & STOUT, supra note 134, at 9. 
 141. Id. at 11. Pell Grant funding will be denied to anyone incarcerated in any 
federal or state penal institution. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, 103d Cong. (1994). 
 142. Lambie & Randell, supra note 106, at 452. Peer contagion could explain 
this effect; that is, youths’ confinement with other, more antisocial youth might 
result in their further criminalization. Id. 
 143. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 144. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 145. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
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less developed and their personality traits more mutable, they are less 
likely to be “irretrievably depraved.”146 
Given these differences, the Court found that the justifications for 
punishment apply with less force to children. Children are not as morally 
culpable because of their immaturity and diminished sense of responsibility; 
thus retributivist justifications for punishment are not as great as for 
adults.147 Moreover, the impetuosity of youth renders deterrence an unlikely 
and possibly unattainable goal because it is premised on the notion that the 
individual can and will engage in a cost-benefit analysis before offending.148 
Even the incapacitation of juveniles under certain conditions cannot be 
justified if the decision to imprison is made without consideration of their 
potential for growth and change.149 Because children are still maturing and 
their characters still forming, the conclusion that they are beyond the reach 
of society is less supportable.150 
The context in which these Supreme Court cases arose, however, is a 
relatively narrow one—the cases all involved children who had been 
transferred to criminal court to be tried as adults.151 Furthermore, the 
sentences the Court considered are the harshest sentences that could be 
imposed in the criminal justice system: the death penalty and life without 
the possibility of parole.152 The Court held that the imposition of the death 
                                                                                                             
 146. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; accord Miller, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2464. 
 147. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–72; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
 148. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 72; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72. 
 149. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 73. 
 150. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 
 151. Christopher Simmons, who was 17 when he committed the offense, was 
tried automatically as an adult in a Missouri criminal court. Roper, 543 U.S. at 
557. Terrance Graham was tried as an adult based on the prosecutor’s decision to 
file charges in criminal court. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53. The life sentence was 
imposed after Graham admitted to violating the terms of his probation by fleeing 
from police officers. Id. at 55–57. Evan Miller was 14 years old at the time of the 
crime. A juvenile court judge waived Miller to criminal court on the motion of the 
district attorney and after a hearing. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. In the companion 
case, Kuntrell Jackson, who also was 14 at the time of the offense, was charged 
as an adult under a statute that gave the prosecutor discretion to file in criminal 
court. Id. at 2461. 
 152. In Roper, Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death. 543 U.S. at 558. 
In Graham, Terrance Graham was sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole for a non-homicide offense. 560 U.S. at 57. In Miller, both Evan Miller and 
Kuntrell Jackson received mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of 
parole for their homicide offenses. 132 S. Ct. 2461, 2463. 
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penalty on a juvenile who committed the crime before the age of 18 
violated the Eighth Amendment because youth are “categorically less 
culpable,” thereby rendering a sentence of death disproportionate.153 
Similarly, life without the possibility of parole when the accused has not 
killed is categorically barred if the offender is under the age of 18 when 
the offense occurred.154 Moreover, the Court concluded that a mandatory 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole when the minor does kill 
is unconstitutional in the absence of an individualized, yet “uncommon,” 
determination about the appropriateness of the sentence.155 Thus life 
without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense and death for 
anyone under the age of 18 are categorically barred. Life without parole 
for a homicide offense, however, may be imposed but only after an 
individualized judicial determination about the appropriateness of such a 
sentence. 
The Court also rejected the argument that the discretion exercised 
when transferring a juvenile to adult court for trial is the constitutional 
equivalent of the discretion exercised during post-trial sentencing in 
criminal court. Mandatory waiver provisions do not involve the exercise of 
discretion and thus cannot serve as a substitute for the type of individualized 
determinations the Court envisioned.156 Nor is prosecutorial discretion 
satisfactory in the absence of judicial reevaluation or review.157 Even a 
judge’s decision to transfer a minor to criminal court for trial is insufficient 
because of the paucity of information generally available to the court when 
the judge makes the transfer decision.158 Furthermore, the decision to 
waive a minor to criminal court might stem from a judicial determination 
that the minor warrants more punishment than the juvenile court can mete 
out.159 This determination, however, does not necessarily mean that life 
without the possibility of parole is warranted.160 
There are a number of reforms suggested by the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that children are constitutionally different. There are those 
directly mandated by the Court’s jurisprudence, such as no juvenile 
offender shall be executed for a crime committed under the age of 18 and 
no minor shall serve a mandatory life sentence in a non-homicide case 
                                                                                                             
 153. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567. 
 154. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
 155. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 156. Id. at 2474. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 2475. 
 160. Id. at 2474–75. 
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without the possibility of parole. Moreover, a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole cannot be imposed without an individualized 
determination that the minor is one of the rare juveniles who warrants this 
punishment. Indeed, the various mechanisms by which juveniles are 
waived to criminal court are inadequate substitutes for the determination 
made by the judge that a juvenile should receive life without the possibility 
of parole. 
Some commentators, however, suggest that these cases have a much 
broader reach. For example, some argue that the imposition of any 
mandatory sentence on a juvenile is unconstitutional because it precludes 
any individualized determination that the sentence is warranted.161 Within 
such a framework, parole eligibility would be expanded and juveniles 
would be entitled to more frequent parole hearings.162 Moreover, the 
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, such as a criminal record 
or lifetime registration requirements for sex offenders, should be limited 
when the offender is a juvenile.163 Even criminal sentencing enhancement 
provisions, which allow the court to consider a juvenile adjudication as a 
predicate offense, would run afoul of the Constitution under this view.164 
Additionally, the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has 
applicability to other aspects of the juvenile justice system. For example, 
a juvenile court judge’s decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court for 
trial suggests nothing about the appropriateness of any criminal sentence he 
may receive. The Court’s emphasis on the psychosocial development of 
children would militate in favor of a juvenile justice system that would retain 
jurisdiction over older teenage offenders.165 Furthermore, programming 
should be rehabilitative to facilitate reform.166 Similarly, the collateral 
consequences of juvenile adjudication, particularly those extending well 
into adulthood, should be reconsidered in light of the Court’s emphasis on 
the lessened moral culpability of youth.167 
Although juveniles obviously have an Eighth Amendment right, to 
what extent that right applies outside the limited context of the Supreme 
Court cases is unclear. For example, whether the right extends to the quasi-
                                                                                                             
 161. ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., MODELS FOR CHANGE: SYSTEMS REFORM IN 
JUV. JUST., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE 
SENTENCING 26 (Sep. 2015). 
 162. Id. at 27–29. 
 163. Id. at 27. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 29. 
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 167. Id. at 27. 
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criminal proceedings within the juvenile court itself is uncertain given that 
a juvenile court adjudication arguably provides a lesser and more 
proportional punishment than the punishment within the criminal justice 
system. Moreover, the Court did not preclude the imposition of life 
without the possibility of parole in a homicide case if an individualized 
determination that passes constitutional muster occurs.168 The Court 
rejected a categorical bar on all sentences of life without parole albeit with 
the understanding that the sentencing party will consider all the 
circumstances of the juvenile offender and how those circumstances may 
warrant mitigation at sentencing.169 Finally, the Court did recognize that 
some juveniles deserve severe punishment.170 
Although the Court has recognized that children do have constitutional 
rights, many of those rights are analyzed within a framework applicable to 
all constitutional persons. In the Eighth Amendment context, the Court has 
applied a disproportionality analysis in determining whether juveniles may 
be executed or given a life sentence.171 The offender’s status as a child can 
bar the imposition of certain types of punishment, just as the offender’s 
status as a mentally disabled offender would,172 but the child’s status as 
an offender does not prohibit the imposition of all criminal sanctions. 
Retribution, deterrence, and incarceration remain as valid state responses 
to juvenile offending. This jurisprudential narrative thus begins and ends 
with punishment. 
B. The Right to Redemption 
Articulating a separate theoretical framework that applies to the rights 
of children is therefore critical. The law, however, emphasizes competence 
as a prerequisite to having and exercising rights; thus formulating a 
framework for children within such a construct has been difficult.173 
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Rather, a framework for children’s rights should emphasize children’s 
powerlessness. Children, because they are powerless, have rights claims 
against the more powerful.174 In juvenile and criminal offending, 
therefore, children would have claims against the state because the state is 
obviously holding the balance of power; to put it succinctly, rights flow to 
the powerless.175 
The child’s claim of a right to redemption checks the state’s exercise 
of power. That rights claim is more expansive than simply the right against 
cruel and unusual punishment embedded in the Eighth Amendment. The 
right to redemption looks beyond punishment and envisions the 
reintegration of the child into society as a fully functioning citizen. This 
right thus imposes on the state a correlative duty to provide the means by 
which the child may have that future. Framing the right in this way 
changes the narrative from what the state has the power to do to the child 
to one in which the child may claim state-created opportunities for 
rehabilitation and reform. 
Although the right to redemption might seemingly be a radical 
departure from other rights that are accorded children, the framework for 
such a right is not new. Article 40(1) of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) recognizes that when a child is accused 
of or has violated a State Party’s penal law, the child has the right to be 
“treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of 
dignity and worth.”176 The State Party must take into account the child’s 
age, the desirability of promoting the child’s re-integration into society, and 
the child’s assumption of a constructive role in society.177 Moreover, Article 
40(3) states that States Parties must create specialized procedures for 
juveniles accused of violating the law and resort to judicial proceedings only 
when appropriate.178 Finally, Article 40(4) envisions treatment that is 
“appropriate to their well-being and proportionate both to their 
circumstances and the offence” as an alternative to treatment.179 
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Although the United States is the only country that has not ratified the 
CRC,180 the Supreme Court has found its provisions instructive in the 
Eighth Amendment context. In considering the constitutionality of the 
death penalty as applied to minors, for example, the Court noted that 
Article 37 of the CRC expressly prohibits capital punishment of offenders 
who committed their crimes when they were under 18.181 In concluding 
that the Constitution categorically bars the imposition of life without the 
possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses that juveniles commit, the 
Supreme Court again referenced Article 37, which also prohibits “life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release . . . for offences [sic] 
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”182 In both cases, the 
Court stated with some dismay that “the United States now stands alone 
in a world that has turned its face against” these penalties for children.183 
Additionally, the Court seemed to imply that a deeper and more 
meaningful right might exist. In discussing the application of the death 
penalty and life without the possibility of parole to offenders who 
committed their crimes before the age of 18, the Court’s language suggests 
that minors are not beyond redemption. The Court argued that “juveniles 
have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape 
negative influences in their whole environment”184 and that “[f]rom a 
moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor 
with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s 
character deficiencies will be reformed.”185 The Court rejected the 
argument that juveniles are “irretrievably depraved”186 and noted that 
these penalties are a “denial of hope.”187 Finally, the Court expressly 
stated that “juvenile[s] should not be deprived of the opportunity to 
achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and 
potential.”188 
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“[C]hildren are constitutionally different from adults”189 is the Court’s 
most powerful articulation of a right to redemption. “Youth matters,”190 
the Court emphasized, because children lack maturity and are impulsive. 
Youth matters because children are subject to negative influences and have 
less control over their environments. Youth matters because children are 
capable of change. They are not simply “miniature adults”191 but unique 
constitutional persons to whom special principles must apply. “Indeed, it 
is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for 
children.”192 
Furthermore, the Court’s acknowledgment that children are relatively 
powerless supports a right to redemption grounded in a jurisprudential 
framework in which rights flow to the less powerful. The Court noted that 
children are particularly vulnerable because they cannot easily escape the 
negative influences to which they might be subjected.193 Moreover, the 
Court recognized that children remain vulnerable within the justice system 
itself because the procedures by which juveniles are tried in criminal court 
fail to protect them. When juveniles are transferred automatically, they 
receive no individualized determination of the appropriateness or 
suitability of the transfer.194 But even when a court decides to transfer a 
minor, that exercise of judicial discretion often occurs in the absence of 
full information and may be driven by considerations other than the child’s 
immaturity.195 Thus the Court’s imposition of categorical rules stems from 
the Court’s concern that assessments of culpability will be subjective and 
inaccurate.196  
A right to redemption thus offers a way forward. By recognizing that 
children are different, a more coherent children’s rights theory that 
accommodates their inherent powerlessness may be formulated. The fact 
that the state has power is indisputable, and checking that power requires 
a right. Rights do more than simply allow the claimant to be heard: they 
command the attention and respect of the powerful and raise the claimants 
up so that they might be heard. In asserting a right to redemption, the 
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conversation changes from a discussion about punishment to one about 
reformation and respect and ultimately to the recognition that children 
have special rights that consider their vulnerabilities and powerlessness. 
CONCLUSION 
While it is clear that fewer juveniles are offending, youth of color 
remain disproportionately involved with the juvenile and criminal justice 
systems. For these youth, the emphasis often remains on punishment and 
accountability rather than reformation. But if we begin from the premise 
that children have a right to redemption—a right suggested by the Supreme 
Court’s recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—then we may begin to 
understand the promise of children’s rights. 

